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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS: MECHANIC'S
EQUITABLE LIEN ON CONSTRUCTION
LOAN FUNDS
In addition to the well-recognized remedies available to sup-
pliers of labor or materials under Sections 1181 and 1190.1(h) of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and by general contract action against
the owner and/or contractor, the California courts in Smith v.
Anglo-California Trust Co.1 and Pacific Ready-Cut Homes v. Title
Ins. & Trust Co.2 established the doctrine of an equitable lien upon
the funds of a construction loan. This doctrine is still in force and
is recognized by the courts today.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
The California interpretation of the equitable lien doctrine as
it influences the rights of mechanic's lien claimants first appeared
in Smith. In this case an owner-builder died before completion of
the improvements and the mechanic's lien claimants were denied
access to the construction loan funds under the third-party bene-
ficiary theory. However, the court held:
What we have said, however, need not necessarily prove fatal to the
cause of the appealing mechanics' lien claimants if there exist any
special circumstances warranting the imposition in their favor of a
charge or lien upon the fund now in dispute. We are of the view that
the money remaining undisbursed ... be so charged. And this by rea-
son of those special circumstances and conditions of representations
and conduct upon one side and of action founded thereon upon the
other. 3 (Emphasis added.)
The equitable lien doctrine thus established in the Smith case
was followed in Pacific Ready-Cut Homes. In this case the court
was confronted with claims of liens by mechanic's and materialmen
after the borrower had defaulted upon payment of the construction
loan. The court reviewed Smith and held, "The essential basis of
the opinion is the justifiable reliance upon the fund by the lien
claimants."4 Such reliance was found after consideration of the
evidence disclosed that the materialmen had refused to take a con-
1 205 Cal. 496, 271 Pac. 898 (1928).
2 216 Cal. 447, 14 P.2d 510 (1932).
8 Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 502, 271 Pac. 898, 901
(1928).
4 Pacific Ready-Cut Homes v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 450, 14 P.2d
510, 511 (1932).
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tract because the owner was insolvent and the subject property was
heavily encumbered, but the materialmen were told of the construc-
tion loan and thereupon obtained assurance from a representative of
the lender that the proceeds of the loan would be used to pay for
material and labor. In ruling for the lien claimants the court held:
The defendant mortgage company, having received the benefit of
the plaintiff's performance in the form of a completed building and
therefore a more valuable security for its note, is not justified in
withholding or appropriating to any other use money originally in-
tended to be used to pay for such performance, and relied upon by
plaintiff in rendering his performance. 5
Requirements for Equitable Lien
The Smith and Pacific Ready-Cut Homes decisions created the
equitable lien theory based upon certain well-defined factual situa-
tions. These may be summarized as follows:
1. The work of improvement had actually been completed.
2. The value of the completed improvements subject to the
lender's prior security interest was at least equal to the
amount of the loan.
3. There was evidence that the lien claimant in fact relied
upon the construction fund for payment for his labor or
materials supplied.
4. The position of the borrower or lender was such that to
permit either to retain any surplus in the loan fund re-
maining after completion of the work would have unjustly
enriched either or both of them at the expense of the lien
claimants.8
In both Smith and Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, the court em-
phasized the fact that the improvements were in fact completed,
and that the balance remaining in the construction loan accounts was
sought to be diverted either to the borrower (Smith), or to the lender
(Pacific), to the exclusion of unpaid suppliers. Such diversion would
clearly be inequitable since in both situations the borrower-owner
had his completed structure and the lender had its full security.
Bearing in mind the factual situations which gave rise to the
equitable lien doctrine, it is readily understood why the courts have
5 Id. at 452, 14 P.2d at 512.
6 Brief for the California Savings and Loan League as Amicus Curiae, p. 26,
A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 A.C. 790, 394
P.2d 829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1964).
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been reluctant to accept the argument of claimants if the construc-
tion of the improvements is not completed, or there is no evidence
of representations by the lender resulting in reliance upon the fund
by the labor or material supplier.
In a recent decision, A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, the court held:
An equitable lien may be imposed on a construction-loan fund only
if it is established that the borrower or lender induced the supplier
of labor or materials to rely on the fund for payment.
7 (Emphasis
added.)
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision which had
granted the mechanic's lien claimants access to the balance of the
construction loan funds held by the lender. In this case the im-
provements were not completed and there was no evidence of unjust
enrichment of either the lender or the borrower. The claimants were
restricted to their right to a lien on the real property as provided
in Section 1181 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Reliance on the Fund
The essential basis of the equitable lien doctrine is the justifi-
able reliance upon the fund by the lien claimants.'
Thus, in Smith, the court concluded that the mechanic's lien
claimants "must have relied upon ... the amount to be advanced
for building purposes ' in view of the admitted facts that the prop-
erty itself was subject to both a first deed of trust securing the con-
struction loan and a second deed of trust securing the entire pur-
chase price of the land. The two loans combined were equal or
nearly equal to the value of the property in its improved state. More-
over, in Smith, the lien claimants demonstrated their reliance by
making demands upon the lender.
In Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, there was evidence that the lien
claimants investigated the owner's credit, checked the encumbrances
on the property (which included two deeds of trust in addition to
that given for the construction loan), furnished materials only after
verifying the fact that a construction began, and continued to furnish
materials only after having been assured that any funds remaining
upon completion of the structure would be paid to them.
7 61 A.C. 790, 794, 394 P.2d 829, 832, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85, 88 (1964).
s Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 Pac. 898 (1928);
Pacific Ready-Cut Homes v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 14 P.2d 510
(1932); Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 211, 117 P.2d 682 (1941).
9 205 Cal. 496, 501, 271 Pac. 898, 901-02 (1928).
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LIMITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
In every discovered case where an equitable lien has been
imposed upon funds in the hands of a construction lender, the im-
provements had been completed and there was, therefore, a sum
of money due the borrower.' As previously stated, the lien is im-
posed to prevent either unjust enrichment of the lender or the bor-
rower. Thus, in Smith, the court emphasized that "the houses for
the construction of which the building loan account was opened have
been completed,"" and accordingly concluded, "it would be inequi-
table and unjust . . . to permit (the borrower) to withold, at this
time, any part of the fund upon which the lien claimants must surely
have relied for reimbursement."' 2
Similarly, in Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount Plastering, Inc."
the court held that the lien claimants were entitled to the loan sur-
plus since "the appellant (lender) has had the benefit of its security,
now owns the property and the completed buildings thereon, and
seeks to avoid payment therefor. We cannot find that it has any
such right." 4 And in Whiting-Mead Co. v. West Coast etc. Co. 5
the court observed that the lender had "the right, under the agree-
ment, to have on the property a completed structure . . . thus
providing the agreed security for the loan,"' 6 but the building having
been completed, such funds as remained should be paid the me-
chanic's lien claimants.
In cases where there is no completed building, the only security
the lender has for the undisbursed portion of its full loan commit-
ment is the right to retain the undisbursed funds until it has the
security for which it bargained. Depriving the lender of that right
does not prevent unjust enrichment, if the cost of completing the
improvements is equal to or more than that amount remaining
undisbursed in the loan account. The cases hold that in these situa-
tions the lender has the right to expend undisbursed funds to com-
plete the buildings securing its loan, and that, notwithstanding this
expenditure, the lender is still entitled to its first lien priority over
the claims of mechanics and materialmen. 7
10 Brief for the California Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 10, A-1
Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 A.C. 790, 394 P.2d
829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1964).
11 Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 503, 271 Pac. 898, 901
(1928).
12 Id. at 504, 271 Pac. at 901-02.
Is 216 Cal. App. 2d 433, 31 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1963).
14 Id. at 438, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
15 66 Cal. App. 2d 460, 152 P.2d 629 (1944).
16 Id. at 465, 152 P.2d at 632.
17 Brief for the California Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 12, A-1
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OTHER REMEDIES
In addition to the judicially created doctrine of equitable liens,
the labor or material supplier has three remedies available to him
to secure the payment for his labor or services, and the remedies are
cumulative. These remedies are: a recorded lien upon the property
upon which the labor or materials supplier had bestowed labor or
furnished materials, Section 1181 of the Code of Civil Procedure; a
stop notice served upon the lender or other holder of the construction
fund pursuant to Section 1190.1 (h) of the Code of Civil Procedure;
or a suit in contract against the owner or general contractor.' 8
The imposition of an equitable lien has the practical effect of
rendering the mortgagee's first lien subordinate to the claims
of laborers and materialmen. 19 It is commonly argued by construc-
tion lenders and other holders of construction funds that the legis-
lature intended Section 1190.1(h) of the Code of Civil Procedure"0
to supplant this doctrine of equitable relief and to engraft pro-
cedural and other refinements upon it, in order to give additional
protection to all parties concerned.2'
Both the statute and the equitable lien doctrine deal with the
right of a mechanic's lien claimant to subject construction loan funds
to the satisfaction of their claims. In each case, the remedy granted
supplements the claimants' remedies under the mechanic's lien
Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 A.C. 790, 394 P.2d
829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1964), which cites Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Hammond Lumber
Co., 13 Cal.App.2d 538, 57 P.2d 164 (1936); Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v.
Corbett, 138 Cal.App. 644, 33 P.2d 41 (1934); San Mateo Planing Mill Co.
v. Davenport Realty Co., 218 Cal. 702, 24 P.2d 787 (1933).
18 See Comment, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 331, 337 (1963). "Three provisions indi-
cate the property subject to a mechanics' lien: (1) Section 15, Article XX of the
California Constitution provides that the constitutional right to lien shall be 'upon
the property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished material . . .'
(2) Section 1181 provides that the lien shall be 'upon the property upon which
they have bestowed labor or furnished materials or appliances,' and (3) Section
1183.1(a) provides that the 'land upon which any building, improvement, well or
structure is constructed, together with a convenient space about the same, or so
much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation thereof, to be
determined by the court on rendering judgment, is also subject to the lien. .... I"
19 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1190.1(h). This statutory provision permits a sup-
plier of labor or materials to file a bonded stop notice with the lender or other
holder of the construction funds. When the stop notice has been properly filed
the lender is prevented, under possible personal liability, from disbursing to anyone
an amount equal to eighty per-cent of the bond.
20 Barr Lumber Co. v. Shaffer, 108 Cal.App.2d 14, 238 P.2d 99 (1951). See
also Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57 Cal.2d 621, 371 P.2d 578, 21 Cal. Rptr.
802 (1962).
21 Brief for the California Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae, pp. 15-18,
A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 A.C. 790, 394 P.2d
829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1964).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
laws."2 Both remedies are dependant upon a loan having been made
for the purpose of paying for the costs of construction.28
The duties imposed upon the lender by Section 1190.1(h) and
the equitable lien doctrine are similar. The equitable lien doctrine
does not require the lender to take steps to ensure that the funds
disbursed by it were applied to pay for labor and materials,24
and the statute does not purport to do so. When properly invoked,
both prevent the lender from making further disbursements of
money to the borrower or to his general creditors, and the statute,
like the doctrine, prohibits the lender who has been fully secured
by a completed structure, from applying any surplus funds to reduce
the borrower's secured debt to it.25
CONCLUSION
The equitable lien doctrine, if applied within the strict frame-
work as set forth in Smith and Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, serves to
prevent the unjust enrichment of those who are in a position to
control the disbursement of construction funds. Any extension of
this doctrine would tend to make it generally co-extensive in purpose
and effect with Section 1190.1(h). If this should ever occur, an
argument could be advanced that the judicially created doctrine
cannot co-exist with that enacted by the legislature without emascu-
lating the statutory requirements of notice and bond. Such an argu-
ment, if accepted by the courts, would have the effect of merging
the equitable doctrine into the statute, thereby preventing the me-
chanic's lien claimant from perfecting a lien against the construc-
tion funds unless he complied with the strict requirements of Sec-
tion 1190.1(h).
The courts have been prudent in affording equitable relief along
with the other remedies available to mechanic's lien claimants. An
extension of the doctrine may lead to its destruction. However,
when enforced within the requirements established in Smith and
Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, it fills an apparent gap in the protection
of innocent parties threatened with harm.
ROBERT J. ENNIS
22 Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 47 Cal.
App.2d 211, 117 P.2d 682 (1941) (equitable lien); Calhoun v. Huntington Park
First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 186 Cal. App. 2d 451, 9 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1960) (stop notice).
28 Compare Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 Pac. 898(1928) with CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1190.1(h).
24 Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 501-02, 271 Pac. 899,
901 (1928).
25 Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount Plastering, Inc., 216 Cal.App.2d 433,
31 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1963).
